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Abstract
A substantial portion of the literature on fairness in algorithms proposes, analyzes, and
operationalizes simple formulaic criteria for assessing fairness. Two of these criteria, Equal-
ized Odds and Calibration by Group, have gained significant attention for their simplicity
and intuitive appeal, but also for their incompatibility. This chapter provides a perspec-
tive on the meaning and consequences of these and other fairness criteria using graphical
models which reveals Equalized Odds and related criteria to be ultimately misleading. An
assessment of various graphical models suggests that fairness criteria should ultimately be
case-specific and sensitive to the nature of the information the algorithm processes.
Keywords— Fairness in algorithms, graphical model, causality, equalized odds
1 Introduction
The emergence of artificial intelligence’s algorithmic tools represents one of the most important
social and technological developments of the last several decades. Machine learning based scoring
systems now determine creditworthiness of consumers and insurance prices [Robinson and Yu,
2014] and social media metrics [Duffy, 2016], algorithmic hiring platforms target job advertise-
ments and screen re´sume´s to calculate who should and should not be seen by human resource
managers [Ajunwa et al., 2016, Gillum and Tobin, 2019], and predictive analytics are deployed
as sentencing tools in the criminal justice system [Eubanks, 2018]. Big data’s algorithmic tools
have come to play a decisive role in many aspects of our lives. However, there is concern that
these algorithmic tools may lack fairness and exacerbate existing social inequalities [Barocas and
Selbst, 2016, Ziewitz, 2016, O’Neil, 2017, Lum, 2017].
One might imagine that because algorithms are inherently procedural, ensuring fairness
should be a simple matter of not explicitly using race or gender as features [Grgic-Hlaca et al.,
2016]. This notion of fairness has been called Fairness Through Unawareness, and it is easy to
see why it is insufficient. First of all, other features will generally redundantly encode sensitive
variables [Barocas and Selbst, 2016]. We could trivially skirt around Fairness Through Unaware-
ness by including variables which are close proxies for gender or race like hair length or name,
but even less suspicious and eminently predictive features such as zip code, language usage,
or GPA will allow an algorithm to partially infer an individual’s sensitive characteristics and
make generalizations on those bases. Furthermore, including information about an individual’s
sensitive characteristics can actually serve to make a predictive algorithm more fair, especially
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when there are interaction effects between sensitive characteristics and other features. The area
of algorithmic fairness constitutes an attempt to move beyond Fairness Through Unawareness
and develop a link between the mathematical properties of algorithms and our philosophical and
intuitive notions of fairness. Unfortunately, there is little consensus on the philosophical bedrock
upon which algorithmic fairness should rest [Binns, 2017, Chouldechova and Roth, 2018].
Much of the literature on fairness in algorithms has been influenced by a controversy sur-
rounding the Northpointe COMPAS algorithm, an algorithm for predicting criminal recidivism.
Angwin et al. [2016] analyzed the output of the algorithm and determined that its predictions
were unfair due to the fact that the rate of false positives and false negatives differed significantly
between racial groups. In response, Northpointe published a rejoinder arguing the criteria used
by Angwin et al. [2016] to assess fairness were nonstandard, and a proper analysis reveals that
the predictions made by the COMPAS algorithm are in fact calibrated by race [Flores et al.,
2016].
Beyond merely inspiring interest in the study of algorithmic fairness, this controversy may
have influenced the early direction of the field. One significant branch of the field is concerned
with the development, study, comparison, and implementation of simple fairness criteria, much
like the balanced-odds criterion implicit in Angwin et al. [2016] or the calibration criterion used
in Flores et al. [2016]. These fairness criteria have largely been tailored to the classification
setting.
Furthermore, Angwin et al. [2016] had access to limited information in assessing the COMPAS
algorithm; the authors were able to acquire the COMPAS scores for 11,575 pretrial defendants,
along with information about their criminal histories, race, and whether that defendant in fact
went on to reoffend [Larson et al., 2016]. However, these authors did not have access to the precise
features used by the COMPAS algorithm nor the specifications of the COMPAS algorithm itself.
Therefore, the authors assessed the fairness of the COMPAS algorithm by examining its false
positive and false negative rates across races, which can be calculated using only the COMPAS
predictions, the races of the defendants, and whether they reoffended.
Other commonly considered fairness-apt data sets have a similar form; we often desire to
assess whether a predictive algorithm is fair using only information about the predictions, the
observed outcomes, and the race or gender of the subjects. Perhaps for this reason, much of
the early work on algorithmic fairness has centered around so-called oblivious fairness criteria,
which assess algorithms only on the basis of their outputs compared to the ground truth. The
three central oblivious criteria are most often called Demographic Parity, Equalized Odds, and
Calibration by Group, although it is common to encounter these and related concepts under a
host of names.
Two prominent strains of criticism have emerged which cast doubt on the utility of simple
one-size-fits-all metrics for the fairness of algorithms. The first criticism concerns obliviousness;
even alongside the introduction of Equalized Odds, Hardt et al. [2016] note that intuitively
fair and intuitively unfair algorithmic procedures can appear identical if we only compare the
algorithm’s output to the ground truth. Indeed, many of our intuitive notions of fairness have
to do with the nature of the information used to make a prediction, rather than the outcome.
A second strain of criticism concerns incompatibility between the three oblivious fairness
criteria, and thus their lack of universality. Most notably, Chouldechova [2017] and Kleinberg
et al. [2017] proved that Calibration and Equalized Odds could not simultaneously be achieved;
this recast the disagreement between ProPublica and Northpointe as a philosophical rather than
statistical debate.
Various review papers have been written which tie together the outpouring of early ideas in
fairness in algorithms. In this paper, we do not intend to exhaustively catalogue the world of
fairness criteria: instead we will focus on a small number of basic criteria which have received
significant attention, similar to Yeom and Tschantz [2018]. For a comprehensive map of fairness
measures and their relationships to one another, see Mitchell et al. [2018]. Corbett-Davies and
Goel [2018] elucidates the incompatibility of Calibration and Equalized Odds using visualizations
of outcome distributions. These authors argue that the problem of infra-marginality suggests
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that Equalized Odds is a poor criterion for fairness.
We agree. We are concerned that work which generalizes and operationalizes Equalized Odds
may further obscure the criterion’s underlying flaws. The purpose of this article is to provide an
alternate source of intuition about fairness criteria using probabilistic directed acyclic graphical
models. Graphical models have been used to motivate and expose fairness criteria in other works,
especially those which work with explicitly causal criteria for fairness. We believe that graphical
models provide an invaluable source of intuition even in non-causal scenarios, and themselves
reveal the weakness of Equalized Odds.
Using Bayesian networks, we can view fairness criteria in a way which is easily generalized
beyond classification settings. Considering generalizations as defined in Barocas et al. [2018]
of Demographic Parity, Equalized Odds, and Calibration helps to expose certain fundamental
aspects of these criteria which the classification setting obscures.
In Section 2, we provide a brief overview of probabilistic directed graphical models and the
associated causal theory. In Section 3, we define the three oblivious fairness criteria and their
generalizations. In Section 4, we discuss two graphical scenarios and the implications of various
fairness criteria therein. In Section 5, we review the incompatibility between Equalized Odds
and Calibration and give a graphical view of the problem with Equalized Odds. This motivates
a modified class of criteria which we call Separation by Signal. Finally, in Section 6, we discuss
the relationship between causality and fairness.
2 Graphical Models
A directed acyclic graph (DAG) G is a pair {V,E} where V = {V1, . . . , Vn} is a set of nodes and
E is a set of directed edges, each pointing from one node to another. The acyclic property of
DAGs requires that the edges in E never form a directed path leading from one variable back to
itself. Let the parents of Vi, Pa(Vi), refer to the set of nodes which share an edge with Vi such
that the edge is pointing to Vi.
2.1 Probabilistic Directed Acyclic Graphical Models
A probabilistic directed acyclic graphical (PDAG) model, sometimes known as a Bayesian Net-
work, is a pair {G,P} where G is a DAG and P is a probability distribution over the nodes of G
[Pearl, 2009b, Spirtes et al., 2000]. Each node V1, . . . , Vn in G represents a random variable, and
these random variables are jointly governed by the probability distribution P. In this paper, we
will consider only PDAG models which satisfy the Markov Condition. A PDAG model {G,P}
satisfies the Markov Condition only if the probability distribution P can be factored into the
conditional distributions of each node given its parents. That is,
P(V1, . . . , Vn) =
n∏
i=1
P(Vi | Pa(Vi)). (1)
Node V1 is considered an ancestor of node V2 if there is a directed path leading from V1 to V2.
In that case, node V2 is a descendent of V1. A node is a root if it has no ancestors and a leaf
if it has no descendants. The random variables associated with root nodes we call exogenous
because their distribution does not depend on any of the other modelled variables.
In discussing PDAG models, three common relationships between nodes are of particular
interest. Nodes V1 and V3 are confounded by node V2 if V2 is an ancestor of both V3 and V1. In
this case, we say there is a backdoor path between V1 and V3. If V1 is an ancestor of V2 and V2
is an ancestor of V3, then V2 is a mediator of the relationship between V1 and V3. Finally, if V1
and V2 are both ancestors of V3, then V3 is said to be a collider for V1 and V2. See Figure 1 for
a depiction of these relationships.
We can determine certain marginal and conditional independence relationships between the
random variables V1, . . . , Vn using the structure of the DAG. The nodes Vi and Vj are d-separated
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Figure 1: In the leftmost graph, V2 is a confounder, in the center graph, V2 is a mediator, and
in the rightmost graph, V2 is a collider.
V1
V2 V3
V4
Figure 2: Because there are multiple paths from V1 to V4, this PDAG model may be unfaithful
if the effect of V1 on V4 along one path perfectly counteracts the effect along the other path.
if the structure of the DAG implies that Vi and Vj are (marginally) independent, i.e., Vi⊥⊥ Vj .
A set S of nodes d-separates Vi and Vj if the structure of the DAG implies that Vi and Vj are
independent given the variables in S, i.e. Vi⊥⊥ Vj | S. Specifically, under the Markov Condition,
the nodes Vi and Vj are d-separated given S if S blocks all paths between Vi and Vj . A connected
sequence of edges between two nodes is considered a path regardless of the edges’ orientation. A
path is blocked if either:
• it contains a mediator or confounder Vk where Vk ∈ S, or
• it contains a collider Vk where Vk 6∈ S and if Vl is a descendent of Vk, Vl 6∈ S.
Thus, conditioning on colliders (or their descendents) actually unblocks paths and can induce
dependency between marginally independent variables. See Figure 3 for examples. Note that
while d-separation implies conditional independence, d-connection or lack of d-separation does
not necessarily imply dependence. Therefore, it is sometimes useful to make the assumption
that a PDAG model is faithful, which means that every conditional d-connection relationship in
the graph implies dependence between those variables.
Unfaithfulness can occur because whenever there exist multiple paths leading from Vi to Vj ,
the dependencies along those paths can cancel each other out. For example, consider a PDAG
model associated with the DAG in Figure 2. Let V2 = 3V1 + 2, V2 = 2V3 = V1 + 3, and
V4 = −2V2 + 3V3 + 4. Then V4 = 33 − 22 + 4, thus V4 is independent of V1, despite the
fact that V1 and V4 are d-connected. Thus this PDAG model is unfaithful. Note, however,
it is unusual for path effects to precisely cancel each other except when variables are carefully
constructed to do so.
V1
V2 V3 V4
V5 V6
Figure 3: In this PDAG model, nodes V2 and V3 are d-separated a priori, that is, conditional on
the empty set S = ∅. However, conditional on the collider S = {V5}, V2 and V3 are d-connected.
V2 and V4 are d-separated given any of the following sets: {V1},{V1, V5, V3} or {V1, V6, V3}.
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V1
V2 V3
Figure 4: In this PDAG model, V2 and V3 are confounded by the unobserved variable V1; this
will render an expression such as P(V3 | do(V2)) unidentifiable.
2.2 Causality
Strictly speaking, the directed edges in PDAG models need not have any causal interpretation,
as long as they are consistent with the conditional dependencies in P. However, DAGs are not
fully determined by their associated probability distributions: a given probability distribution is
usually consistent with multiple DAGs with differently oriented edges. Thus it is natural to use a
PDAG model to convey causal meaning, so that an edge pointing from Vi to Vj then means that
Vi has a causal effect on Vj . When PDAG models are used in the context of causal inference,
they are often called Structural Causal Models and the associated DAG may be called a Causal
Graph.
Pearl’s theory of causality addresses two types of causal questions: questions about the effects
of manipulating variables and questions about counterfactual states of affairs [Pearl, 2009b]. We
will focus on inferences about variable manipulations. Pearl uses a construct called the do()
operator to express do-statements such as P(V1 = v1 | do(V2 = v2)). This statement can be
interpreted as “the probability that V1 = v1 when we intervene to set V2 = v2.” Formally, to
intervene on the variable V2 by setting it to v2 means to construct an alternate PDAG model in
which the edges between V2 and its ancestors are deleted and the distribution of the root V2 is
set to be a point mass at v2.
These do-statements can sometimes be resolved into equivalent see-statements using Pearl’s
three rules of do-calculus, which are consequences of the Markov Condition. See-statements
are expressions which may involve various conditional probabilities, but do not contain the
do-operator. Thus, see-statements can be evaluated using only information about the joint
probability distribution P of the variables in the original PDAG. Note that in some cases, we may
include unobserved variables in a PDAG model. We will indicate that a variable is unobserved
in a DAG with a dotted outline as in Figure 4. When do-statements cannot be resolved into
see-statements depending only on observed variables, they are called unidentifiable.
For an accessible and more complete introduction to PDAG models and Pearl’s causal theory,
see Pearl et al. [2016], Pearl [2009a]. The purpose of our use of PDAG models in this paper
is mostly to provide intuition regarding sets of variables with various conditional dependency
relationships. However, in Section 6 we will discuss certain aspects of fairness which require a
properly causal treatment.
3 Three Criteria for Fairness
We will review the definitions of three prominent fairness criteria: Independence, Separation,
and Sufficiency, which we will examine through the lens of PDAG models in this paper. Let
Y be a response, an outcome of interest measured for an individual. For example, Y could be
whether an individual will repay a loan, or whether she will click on an advertisement. Let A be
a sensitive characteristic, a categorical variable indicating that individual’s class with respect to
a fairness-apt feature such as race or gender. Let R be a prediction, an estimated response for
that individual.
If we select an individual at random from the population, the quantities Y , A, and R can be
modelled as random variables. We are concerned with assessing whether R is a fair prediction.
The three fairness criteria we examine in this paper are oblivious criteria, which means they
assess only the joint distribution of the tuple (A,R, Y ) [Hardt et al., 2016]. In other words, these
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criteria are not concerned with the functional form of R or the information upon which it is
based; they treat R as a black box.
Most of the work that has been done on fairness criteria for machine learning has considered
the classification setting, in which Y is a categorical (and often binary) variable. Therefore it is
no surprise that each of the three fairness criteria defined in this section were first introduced
as criteria for assessing classifiers. These fairness criteria for the classification setting are known
as Demographic Parity, Equalized Odds, and Calibration by Group. However, Barocas et al.
[2018] offers sensible generalizations of these three criteria to settings with arbitrary, possibly
continuous R and Y . Here we will introduce both the original and generalized versions of each
of the three criteria.
3.1 Demographic Parity and Independence
As a starting point for assessing the fairness of a prediction algorithm, we may ask whether
the algorithm is making systematically different predictions for different groups. Suppose A is
a categorical sensitive characteristic taking values in the set A. Considering only the binary
classification case for the moment, suppose that the response Y ∈ {0, 1} and the prediction
R ∈ {0, 1}.
Definition 1. A prediction R satisfies Demographic Parity if
P (R = 1 | A = a) = P (R = 1 | A = a′)
for every sensitive characteristic a, a′ ∈ A.
In the binary case, this is equivalent to the statement R ⊥⊥ A. Therefore, the natural
generalization of Demographic Parity as suggested by Barocas et al. [2018] is as follows. For
arbitrary random variables R, A and Y ,
Definition 2. A prediction R satisfies Independence if R⊥⊥ A.
This is a strong criterion in the sense that it requires that no aspect of the distribution of R
depend on A. A weaker form of Independence could require only that the expected value and
possibly the variance of R not depend on A. See Johndrow and Lum [2019], Calders et al. [2009],
Calders and Verwer [2010], Del Barrio et al. [2018], Hacker and Wiedemann [2017] for methods
for achieving full or partial Independence in predictions.
3.2 Equalized Odds and Separation
The Independence criterion does not take the response Y into account; that is, it enforces
equality of the distributions of the prediction R across the protected characteristic A even when
the distribution of the response Y may differ across protected classes. For binary classifiers,
Hardt et al. [2016] argues:
Demographic Parity is seriously flawed on two counts. First, it doesn’t ensure fair-
ness. The notion permits that we accept the qualified applicants in one demographic,
but random individuals in another, so long as the percentages of acceptance match.
This behavior can arise naturally, when there is little or no training data available
for one of the demographics. Second, demographic parity often cripples the utility
that we might hope to achieve, especially in the common scenario in which an out-
come to be predicated, e.g. whether the loan will be defaulted, is correlated with the
protected attribute.
In light of this, Hardt et al. [2016] proposes an alternative criterion for fairness. Suppose Y ∈
{0, 1} and the prediction R ∈ {0, 1}.
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Definition 3. A prediction R satisfies Equalized Odds if
P (R = 1 | Y = y,A = a) = P (R = 1 | Y = y,A = a′)
for every sensitive characteristic a, a′ ∈ A and response y ∈ {0, 1}.
Hardt et al. [2016] argues that when Y and A are not independent, Y itself does not satisfy
Demographic Parity, and therefore nor would a “perfect” classifier R = Y . On the other hand, a
“perfect” classifier R = Y will always satisfy Equalized Odds. Thus unless we are attempting to
modify our predictions as a form of affirmative action, Equalized Odds seems to have an advan-
tage over Demographic Parity. In Section 5.2 we argue that this intuition regarding “perfect”
classifiers is an artifact of the discrete classification setting and its motivation has less force in
arbitrary regression settings. Thus we will consider a general form of Equalized Odds offered by
Barocas et al. [2018].
Definition 4. A prediction R satisfies Separation if R⊥⊥ A | Y .
Like Independence, this is a strong criterion, and can be relaxed by requiring only that the
conditional expectation E(R | Y ) and possibly the conditional variance Var(R | Y ) do not
depend on A. See Hardt et al. [2016], Pleiss et al. [2017], Donini et al. [2018], Zafar et al. [2017],
Corbett-Davies et al. [2017] for expositions of Separation-like criteria and methods for enforcing
them.
3.3 Calibration by Group and Sufficiency
Calibration itself is not a fairness concept; it is a popular criterion for assessing an aspect of the
performance of predicted probabilities [Lichtenstein et al., 1981]. Consider the case where the
response Y ∈ {0, 1} is binary and the predicted probability that Y = 1 is P ∈ [0, 1].
Definition 5. A predicted probability P satisfies Calibration if P (Y = 1 | P = p) = p for any
p ∈ [0, 1].
This would suggest that classifications generated by a calibrated predicated probability are
trustworthy in the sense that a practitioner has no incentive to make post-hoc adjustments to
compensate for known biases in ranges of the prediction.
A related criterion, which is directly relevant to fairness, is whether a predicted probability
is calibrated across subpopulations, that is, whether a given predicted probability has the same
meaning when generated for individuals from different subpopulations. Suppose Y ∈ {0, 1} and
P ∈ [0, 1].
Definition 6. A predicted probability P satisfies Calibration by Group if P (Y = 1 | P = p,A =
a) = p for each sensitive attribute a ∈ A and probability p ∈ [0, 1].
Calibration by Group is intuitively appealing because if it is not satisfied, some individuals’
predictions must deviate from the model-grounded truth in a manner depending on their group
membership. That is, a predicted probability P which satisfies Calibration by Group has equal
performance across the sensitive attribute. Indeed, Calibration by Group is a combination of
Calibration and lack of dependence on the sensitive attribute A. The lack of dependence can be
isolated, in terms of a prediction R ∈ {0, 1}, through the following definition.
Definition 7. A prediction rule R ∈ {0, 1} satisfies Predictive Parity if P [Y = 1 | R = r,A =
a] = P [Y = 1 | R = r] where the prediction r ∈ {0, 1} and the sensitive characteristic a ∈ A.
Predictive Parity was discussed and coined by Chouldechova [2017]. Barocas et al. [2018]
present a natural generalization of predictive parity for a not necessarily binary Y and R.
Definition 8. A prediction R satisfies Sufficiency if Y ⊥⊥ A | R.
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AX1
X2
X3
Y
A Race
Y Repays Loan?
X1 Applicant’s Hair Color
X2 Applicant’s Credit Rating
X3 Loan Interest Rate
Figure 5: The random variables in Scenario 1: various features and their relationship to race A
and loan repayment Y .
4 Fairness Criteria in Two Scenarios
To supplement the basic motivations of these three fairness criteria, we will discuss their im-
plications in two prediction scenarios. We will find that these various criteria do not represent
equally viable choices with different subjective implications, but rather that certain criteria are
operational in certain scenarios, and seemingly meaningless in others. Independence has clear
use cases and represents an assumption about the relationships between the sensitive charac-
teristic and the response, or else a desire to impose a regime of special intervention in favor of
a particular group. Sufficiency, on the other hand, serves more as a measure of the extent to
which a prediction takes advantage of all of the information relevant in predicting the response.
And finally, Separation does have meaningful use cases in esoteric scenarios such as Scenario
2. However, in most scenarios of interest, Separation has counterproductive and destructive
implications.
4.1 Scenario 1: Loan Repayment
We wish to predict whether an individual will repay a loan. Suppose we model the situation
using the PDAG in Figure 5.
We consider three features with different conditional dependency structures encoded by this
PDAG model. The applicant’s hair color X1 is a descendant of her race A and is not a mediator
of the effect of A on the whether she repays the loan, Y . Perhaps for this reason, it seems
intuitively unfair (and is illegal in some places [Stowe, 2019]) to determine an applicant’s loan
premium based on her hair color. However, in some cases it may be tempting to do so because
there is a backdoor path connecting X1 and Y , thus X1 and Y are statistically marginally
dependent. The nature of X1 illustrates one shortcoming of Fairness Through Unawareness,
which demands we do not use A itself as an input into our prediction. It would be no violation
of Fairness Through Unawareness to use X1 alone to predict Y . However, if we do so, we are
merely taking advantage of the backdoor path through A; in other words, we are using a noisy
version of A to predict Y rather than A itself.
The applicant’s credit rating X2 is a mediator between A and Y . Therefore, it is statistically
dependent on race, but is also predictive of whether the applicant will repay the loan even
after taking race into consideration. While an applicant’s credit rating is a natural feature for
predicting loan repayment, it redundantly encodes race to some extent. Finally, the interest rate
of the loan X3 influences Y but is marginally independent of race. Therefore, X3 itself seems to
be an innocuous prediction.
We now assess the implications of the Independence, Separation, and Sufficiency criteria in
this context.
4.1.1 Independence
The Independence criterion requires that our prediction R is marginally independent of the ap-
plicant’s race A. Thus, assuming that our PDAG model is faithful, we can achieve Independence
only by positioning R such that it is unconditionally d-separated from A. The applicant’s hair
color X3 is itself d-separated from A, therefore any prediction R which is a descendant only of
X3 will always satisfy Independence.
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AX1
X2
X3
Y
R
Figure 6: This prediction R is d-separated from A and therefore satisfies Independence.
A
X1
X2
X3
Y
X2 R
Figure 7: The prediction R depends on only the part of X2 independent of race A.
However, a prediction R which descends from either the applicant’s hair color X1 or credit
rating X2 would fail to satisfy Independence. Nonetheless, there may remain valuable informa-
tion within X2 which may help us predict Y while maintaining Independence. We can extract
this information by constructing a model which can be represented by the PDAG in Figure 7.
By decomposing X2 into a component which depends on A and an exogenous component
X2 which is marginally independent of A, we can construct a prediction R which uses more
information but is still d-separated from A and thus satisfies Independence. While X2 is observed
in our model, this exogenous component X2 is unobserved, and must be recovered in a model-
specific manner. Consider a simple case, in which X2 | A ∼ N (µA, 1). Then X2 = (X2 − µA) ∼
N (0, 1) would satisfy the conditional independencies encoded by this PDAG model, and thus we
may safely allow our prediction R to depend on X2 .
In the context of this scenario, satisfying Independence while using information about X2
entails that we use a version of X2 which is de-meaned by race. That is, we would use as a
feature an individual’s credit rating relative only to others of the same race.
This procedure may seem justifiable if credit ratings are themselves racially biased and thus
an inaccurate indicator of an individual’s likelihood of repaying the loan. However this is untrue
by assumption in our model, because Y is conditionally independent of A given X2. Thus in
this case, the procedure of de-meaning credit ratings by race to satisfy Independence should be
interpreted as a special modification of the prediction R to benefit a particular (likely disadvan-
taged) group. If credit ratings are in fact racially biased, we may use a modification of the model
in Scenario 1.
In this modified scenario, X2 is a racially biased credit rating which unfairly modifies infor-
mation about an applicant’s true driver of default risk, X2 . Under these assumptions, we can
achieve Independence without sacrificing any predictive accuracy.
Finally, in Scenario 1, no information about an applicant’s hair color X1 can be produc-
tively used while maintaining Independence. Any exogenous components which resulted from a
A
X1
X2
X3
Y
X2 R
Figure 8: A modification of Scenario 1 in which the only part of X2 which contributes to the
response Y is the noise X2 , independent of A.
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X2
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Y
R2
A
X1
X2
X3
Y
R3
Figure 9: Three examples of predictions, each where the prediction rule Rj depends only on the
feature Xj .
decomposition of X1 would be independent of Y ; in this scenario, Independence bars us from
considering an applicant’s hair color entirely.
4.1.2 Separation
The Separation criterion requires that our prediction R is independent of an applicant’s race A
conditional on whether she does in fact repay the loan, Y . We have seen that Independence is
a strong criterion that requires that R has no dependency on A despite the fact that Y itself is
dependent on A. In Scenario 1, we may desire a criterion which allows us to take into account
more information about the applicant’s credit rating X2 (because X2 has a direct and perhaps
causal relationship with Y ). Nonetheless, we may we still desire that our criterion prohibits the
use of spurious information like hair color, X1.
However, in this scenario, Separation does no such thing. To see this clearly, we will consider
all prediction rules which are descendants of only one feature. Let Rj denote an arbitrary
prediction rule which depends on only the feature Xj , for each j = 1, 2, 3.
Any prediction R1 depending on only X1 violates Separation as expected, since Y does not
d-separate R1 and A. But this is also the case for R2: Y does not block the path between R2
and A. Even more surprisingly, because Y is a collider, conditioning on Y actually unblocks the
path between R3 and A. Therefore even though the interest rate of the loan X3 was eligible for
use under Independence due to its independence with A, it cannot be used under Separation.
Extracting components from the features X1, X2 or X3 is also futile; any graphical descendent
or ancestor of these features would still be d-connected to A given Y .
In general, Separation prevents us from constructing any predictions which are descendants
of X1, X2 or X3 in a faithful PDAG model. We can, however, induce a violation of faithfulness
to force independence between R and A. To do so, we must let R be a direct descendent of A.
For example, considering for simplicity a prediction using information about credit rating, X2,
suppose we the PDAG model contains the following Gaussian linear model:
Y | X2 ∼ N (βX2, σ2),
X2 | A ∼ N (µA, σ2A).
As throughout this paper, assume that all of the model parameters, β, σ2, µA, and σ
2
A are
known. Then, by basic properties of the multivariate normal distribution [Moser, 1996],
X2 | Y,A ∼ N
(
(1− ρA)µA + ρAY
β
, σ2ρA
)
,
where ρA =
β2σ2A
β2σ2A+σ
2 . As we may have anticipated due to the structure of the PDAG model, the
mean and variance of X2 given Y still depend on race A. However, we can use this conditional
distribution to construct the optimal linear prediction R which cancels out these dependencies
by explicitly taking into account the race A. It is:
R(X2) = β
(
X2 − (1− ρA)µA
ρA
)
+ Z,
where Z ∼ N (0, (c− 1ρA )σ2) is an independent source of noise, and c = max{ 1ρa } across all races,
a ∈ A. Thus, R’s dependencies are encoded by the new PDAG model which is not faithful,
depicted in Figure 10.
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Figure 10: The prediction R takes as input both A and X2, whose effects conspire to violate
faithfulness and make R⊥⊥ A | Y .
Figure 11: Here, the mean and variance of the distribution of X2 differs between groups. In
Group 1 (•), X2 has a lower mean and greater variance than Group 2 (•). However, for both
groups, Y = βX2 + . That is, the known regression line ( ) accurately captures the signal
component of Y for both groups. Nonetheless, the modified predictions satisfying Separation
for Group 1 ( ) and Group 2 ( ) differ and greatly deviate from the true regression
line. Furthermore, to achieve equal conditional prediction variance between groups, we must
randomize the predictions for Group 1; the lighter dotted lines ( ) indicate two-standard-
deviation bounds for the randomized predictions.
Note that R(X2) | Y ∼ N (Y, cσ2), and this distribution does not depend on A. However,
this prediction rule R is suspicious perhaps most notably because it requires that the addition
of Harrison Bergeron-esque noise to to the predictions for certain individuals in order to achieve
parity in prediction error across groups. The inclusion of additional noise is similar to a result
found in Pleiss et al. [2017] for discrete classifiers. A depiction of the prediction R above is in
Figure 11.
Thus, in Scenario 1, Separation does not seem to be a natural criterion for fairness because it
suggests only counterproductive procedures for constructing estimators. However, we will show
that in Scenario 2, Separation sometimes has the power to discriminate between subjectively
different prediction rules.
4.1.3 Sufficiency
The Sufficiency criterion demands that whether an applicant will repay her loan Y is independent
of her race A conditional on the prediction R. Because R will always be a graphical descendent
of some subset of the features, X1, X2, and X3, we can see from Figure 9 that we cannot achieve
Sufficiency merely by carefully choosing R’s arguments. Conditioning on R will never d-separate
Y from A.
However, we can see that the applicant’s credit rating X2 d-separates Y from A, and therefore
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A Gender
Y Is Programmer?
X1 Visited pinterest.com?
X2 Visited stackexchange.com?
Figure 12: The random variables in Scenario 2: various features and their relationship to gender
A and progamming employment Y .
any invertible functionR(X2) will satisfy Sufficiency. This argument will not generally work when
the prediction rule R is a function of more than one feature, though, since it is not generally
possible to invert such a function. Indeed, in order to construct a prediction rule R(X2, X3)
which satisfies Separation, the prediction R must explicitly block the path between A and Y .
This can be done when the response Y only depends on the features X2 and X3 through a
parameter θ(X2, X3): in this case, the predictor R = θ satisfies Sufficiency. Of course, the
parameter θ which controls the way in which the probability of loan repayment depends on the
loan interest rate X3 and an applicant’s credit rating X2 is not known in practice, so this exact
predictor is not available for use. This argument further shows that, in this case, the only way
that prediction rules which are estimated from training data can be Sufficient is through their
recovery of the signal.
4.2 Scenario 2: Job Advertisement
In this scenario, modelled after a similar scenario from Barocas et al. [2018], we are looking to
serve advertisements for a programming job to web users who are likely to be programmers. To
predict whether or not the user is a programmer, we use information about his or her browsing
history. For a real life example of issues in fairness which may arise from serving job advertise-
ments, see Gillum and Tobin [2019]. Suppose we model the relationship between measurements
on an individual user using the PDAG in Figure 12.
We assume X1, a variable indicating whether a user has visited pinterest.com, has no
relationship to whether or not the individual is a programmer except by virtue of the information
it encodes about gender. The novelty of this scenario is that we observe X2, a variable indicating
whether a user has visited stackexchange.com, which we assume is a graphical descendant
of whether a user is a programmer, Y . According to this model, a user’s gender affects the
likelihood that he or she is a programmer, but a programmer has a certain likelihood of visiting
stackexchange.com regardless of his or her gender.
Therefore if we do not wish to target users for this employment advertisement based on
gender, X1 is a suspicious candidate, but X2 may reasonably be considered fair game. We now
examine the implications of the oblivious criteria in this scenario.
4.2.1 Independence
As in Scenario 1, if the prediction R depends on whether a user has visited pinterest.com, X1,
R will violate Independence, and any information in X1 which is independent of a user’s gender
A will also be independent of whether he or she is a programmer, Y . Furthermore, because
X2 is a descendant of Y with no backdoor connection to A, any component of whether the
user has visited stackexchange.com, X2, which is independent of A will also be independent
of Y . Therefore, we cannot construct any non-trivial predictions R in Scenario 2 which satisfy
Independence.
4.2.2 Separation
On the other hand, Scenario 2 is where Separation shines. Consider again estimators which
depend on only one feature: let R1 denote an arbitrary prediction rule which depends on only
X1, and, likewise, let R2 denote an arbitrary prediction rule which depends on only X2.
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Figure 13: Two examples of predictions, each where the prediction rule Rj depends only on the
feature Xj .
A
X1
U X2
Y R2
A Gender
Y Clicks Job Ad?
U Is Programmer?
X1 Visited pinterest.com?
X2 Visited stackexchange.com?
Figure 14: A perhaps more realistic DAG that underlies the click-predicting task in Scenario 2.
A prediction R1 will fail to satisfy Separation because conditioning on whether a user is a
programmer, Y , does not d-separate whether he or she has visited pinterest.com, X1, and
his or her gender, A. Clearly, this will be the case regardless of what information we extract
from X1. However, any prediction which is a descendent only of whether the user has visited
stackexchange.com, X2, will in fact satisfy Separation, because conditioning on Y blocks the
path between X2 and A.
Thus we can interpret Separation as a criterion which encourages us to use information
which depends on A only through the response, Y . However, it is not clear that there are many
situations in which we observe features which behave as graphical descendants of the response.
We are generally interested in using features which temporally precede the observation of Y ;
usually X causes Y and not the other way around.
In fact Scenario 2, which was designed to illustrate a possible use of the Separation criterion,
is unrealistic. A modification to Scenario 2 which is more realistic can be modelled with the
PDAG in Figure 14.
Here, whether or not a user is a programmer is actually an unobserved variable, U , and is
relevant to us only because it determines the likelihood of the observable event that the user
clicks on our advertisement, Y . From this more realistic model we can see that Y no longer
d-separates R2 from A. Thus to the extent that Y is not identical to U , Separation will not
hold.
4.2.3 Sufficiency
In contrast to Scenario 1, we cannot construct a non-trivial prediction satisfying Sufficiency.
Neither X1 nor X2 are mediators of the effect of A on Y . The only way our prediction R could
block the direct path between A and Y would be for R to perfectly encode the information in
A.
5 Understanding Separation
Among the three oblivious criteria of fairness discussed, we are most skeptical of Separation. As
mentioned in Section 3.2, there is a significant literature focused on applying and generalizing
the criterion. However, unlike the other criteria, Separation has fundamental limitations, which
we now explore.
In Section 4.2.2, we found that predictions R which are a function of features that are
descendants of the response Y will satisfy Separation, so we will now focus on other cases. In
particular, we will focus on an arrangement of the features, sensitive characteristic, and response
which we feel is most likely to occur in practice. We assume the DAG is arranged so that
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Y
Figure 15: An example of a DAG where all features are mediators between the sensitive charac-
teristic A and the response Y .
the sensitive characteristic A is a root, the response Y is a leaf, and none of the features are
descendants of the response. We feel that this DAG is ubiquitous since predictions are often
made about the future, so that the features will need to be causal ancestors of the response.
An example of such an arrangement is provided in Scenario 1. To be concrete, we will focus
on a typical example of a DAG which encodes dependencies between the features, visualized in
Figure 15.
We will let A be a root node which may be an ancestor of any of the features, X1, . . . , Xp.
Furthermore, features may be ancestors or descendants of each other, but all of the features are
ancestors of the response, Y .
We will now argue that Separation will tend not to hold by examining the structure of the
typical DAG, which is visualized with a prediction R in the leftmost graph of Figure 17. There,
conditioning on a leaf of the graph, the response Y , will not generally block paths from the
root, the sensitive characteristic A, to the prediction R, which depends on the mediators, the
features X. This is due to a nondegeneracy of the graph: the response Y will be influenced by
exogenous random noise, say , in addition to a signal through the features X1, . . . , Xp. Due to
the interference of the noise , the information in the response Y is fundamentally different than
the information in the features, which leads to the impossibility of blocking, and the failure of
Separation.
This argument is easiest to see in the case of the visualized Figure 17, but holds more
generally. Whenever there is at least one feature which is an ancestor of the response Y : the
exogenous noise  will still interfere with the response Y , leading to an inability to recover
the information in the feature. Specializing the conclusion of this argument to the binary case
uncovers a peculiarity in Equalized Odds, despite that Equalized Odds is derived from common
measures for summarizing the accuracy of a classifier.
5.1 Incompatibility between Separation and Sufficiency
Measures of fairness were beginning to be intensely studied and debated when Kleinberg et al.
[2017] and Chouldechova [2017] established the surprising result that Calibration and Equalized
Odds cannot simultaneously hold in all but degenerate settings. Specifically, it was established:
Theorem 1. Consider the binary setting, where the response Y ∈ {0, 1} and the prediction
R ∈ {0, 1}. When R 6= Y , the prediction R can only satisfy both Equalized Odds and Calibration
by Group if P (Y = 1 | A = a) = P (Y = 1 | A = a′) for all a, a′ ∈ A, i.e., the mean response
does not differ between levels of the protected characteristic A.
The theorem has been generalized beyond the binary case to hold for Separation and Sufficiency.
Barocas et al. [2018] provide an argument using undirected graphs, which we now reproduce.
In Theorem 1, we assumed that R 6= Y . In the general case, we similarly, but more generally,
assume that all events in the joint distribution of (A,R, Y ) have positive probability. This
assumption makes it so that there’s no degeneracy between the random variables. Consider an
undirected graphical model of the variables A, R and Y .
Separation requires that R⊥⊥ A | Y , so that there can be no edge between A and R. Similarly,
Sufficiency requires that Y ⊥⊥ A | R, so that there can be no edge between A and Y . We
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Figure 16: A depiction of the prohibited paths between the random variables A,R, and Y under
Separation and Sufficiency.
A
X1 X2 X3
R
Y
A
X1 X2 X3
θ R
Y
Figure 17: The leftmost graph is the same example graph, and the rightmost graph shows the
signal parameter θ.
indicate the impossibility of an edge with a dashed line. Therefore, it must hold that A⊥⊥ Y ,
since there can be no path drawn connecting A and Y . This establishes the result: under the
non-degeneracy assumption, if Separation and Sufficiency both hold, it must be that A⊥⊥ Y .
The condition A⊥⊥ Y is a generalization of the condition in Theorem 1 that the mean response
does not differ between levels of the protected characteristic A.
These results cast the disagreement between ProPublica [Angwin et al., 2016] and North-
pointe [Flores et al., 2016] in a new light. On one hand, the failure of the COMPAS algorithm
to achieve equal error rates between groups does not seem to be an objective form of unfairness
if it is mathematically impossible for a calibrated classifier to do so. On the other hand, there
remains the question of whether disparate impact caused by unbalanced error rates is sufficient
cause to dispense with calibration.
In binary classification settings, it is common to characterize the performance of a classifier
using the false positive and false negative rate. These quantities specify the distribution of
R given Y . However, as we have seen using the example of a simple linear regression model
in Section 4.1.2, attempting to enforce parity between quantities conditional on Y can lead to
counterproductive procedures. Furthermore, as we have argued, even when Calibration by Group
does not hold, in general there is no reason to expect conditioning on Y to block the paths between
R and A. Thus we believe that the choice between Calibration by Group and Equalized Odds
is not a mere subjective trade-off; instead we find Separation to be a fundamentally unhelpful
fairness criterion.
5.2 Parity by Signal
The original motivation of Equalized Odds [Hardt et al., 2016] was to overcome limitations of
Independence. In addition to the stringency of the criterion, the authors argue that a limitation
of the criterion is that the response Y itself does not satisfy Independence whenever there is
dependence between Y and the sensitive characteristic A. This is undesirable, they write, since
the response Y is an “ideal [prediction], which can hardly be considered discriminatory as it
represents the actual outcome.”
This line of reasoning seems to obscure a crucial point. When the probability distribu-
tion of the response Y depends on the features X1, . . . , Xp only through a signal parameter
θ(A,X1, . . . , Xp), which we could take without loss of generality to be the conditional mean
E[Y | A,X1, . . . , Xp] when θ is one-dimensional, the signal θ will not be an allowable prediction
under Separation. This follows by the same reasoning as in Section 5: in non-degenerate set-
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tings, conditioning on the response Y will not block the dependence between any of its ancestors.
This is a significant limitation since the discrepancy between the response Y and the signal θ is
generally unique to each individual and cannot be predicted. Indeed, no prediction rule R can
achieve zero prediction error when the response Y has an exogenous noise component. Therefore,
in practicality, the perfect prediction R is the signal θ, not the response Y . With this in mind,
we explicitly define a new measure of fairness.
Definition 9. Represent Y = Fθ(A,X1,...,Xp)(), where  is exogenous noise, that is,  ⊥⊥
A,X1, . . . , Xp, and F is a function indexed by a signal parameter θ. Then a prediction R
satisfies Parity by Signal when R is conditionally independent of the sensitive attribute A given
the signal θ, i.e. R⊥⊥ A | θ.
Another way to view this definition of fairness is that the predictions for similar people do
not unnecessarily depend on the sensitive characteristic, where similar people are defined to
be those whose features contribute—via the signal θ(A,X1, . . . , Xp)—in the same way to the
outcome. This is related to the measure of fairness described by Dwork et al. [2012], wherein
Separation by Signal would be considered as utilizing a perfect similarity metric. In Scenario
1, an optimal prediction rule which satisfies Separation was presented, and it was found to be
unusual: however, in that same scenario, the true mean does indeed satisfy Parity by Signal.
This definition of fairness is not without its limitations. Evaluating whether a prediction R
satisfies Separation by Signal requires the signal θ, which is generally not known in practice.
Above we demonstrated that Separation by Signal is a useful device to develop understanding,
but a close variant of it can also be made operational. Separation by Signal compares the
prediction R to the signal θ, but, instead, R could be compared to another prediction S which
we believe to be more accurate than R.
Definition 10. A prediction R satisfies Parity by S if R is conditionally independent of the
sensitive attribute A given S, i.e. R⊥⊥ A | S.
Notice that a prediction R satisfies Separation by Signal if and only if R satisfies Separation by
θ.
We can interpret a variety of fairness-testing procedures as a form of testing for Parity by
S. For example, in the context of testing whether various police precincts exhibit racial bias in
contraband searches, Simoiu et al. [2017] develop a threshold test which is a test for a kind of
Parity by Signal. They are in the binary setting and consider the prediction R(X1, . . . , Xn) =
I [pA(X1, . . . , Xp) > tA] to be that an individual is carrying contraband when the probability
pA(X1, . . . , Xp) of the individual carrying contraband is larger than a threshold tA and to be
that an individual is not carrying contraband otherwise. They develop Bayesian tests for whether
the threshold tA depends on the race A, since they argue that a fundamental form of unfairness
occurs when minorities are ruled against more stringent thresholds. Due to the prediction R
depending only on the probability pA and the threshold tA, this is a test for whether R satisfies
Parity by pA.
In the above example, the threshold test sought to determine whether there was a specific
form of bias in police officers’ decisions to search for contraband. This is an example of testing
subjective human predictions, with some modeling assumptions. However, a Separation by S
criterion can also be desirable to hold for a prediction R even when both R and S are generated
by machine algorithms. Consider cases in which we believe that a model is unfair due to misspec-
ification; perhaps this model is missing necessary features or fails to model interactions between
the sensitive characteristic and other features in a way which leads the predictions generated
by the algorithm to disparately impact certain groups. (See in particular Scenario 1: The Red
Car in Kusner et al. [2017].) Specifically, suppose that the prediction R(X) = βTX and the
prediction S(X) = βTAX, where each coefficient βA differs based on the sensitive characteristic
A. In this case, a likelihood ratio test [Agresti, 2015] between these models would be a test for
whether R satisfies Separation by S.
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Figure 18: The random variables in Scenario 3: various features and their relationship to race
A and drop out status Y .
6 Causal Considerations
In various discussions of Independence and Separation-like criteria, authors propose general-
izations which enforce parity only after conditioning on certain features [Barocas et al., 2018,
Hardt et al., 2016, Donini et al., 2018]. Consider the following generalizations of Independence.
Suppose X is some subvector of the features X1, . . . , Xp.
Definition 11. A prediction R satisfies Conditional Independence with respect to X if R⊥⊥ A |
X.
Notice that Conditional Independence with respect to (X1, . . . , Xp) always holds when the
prediction R is a deterministic function of the features X1, . . . , Xp. This reinforces that the
purpose of Conditional Independence is to study the influence of a subvector X of the fea-
tures. Notice also the connection to Parity by Signal and Parity by a prediction S, discussed
in Section 5.2, which involve evaluating independence conditional on a specific function of the
features.
Conditional Independence criteria themselves convey little information about the underlying
desires of the practitioner. However, causal reasoning can provide principled methods for devel-
oping fairness criteria which may ultimately be expressed as Conditional Independence criteria.
Here, we discuss two scenarios in which Conditional Independence criteria can be derived using
causal reasoning. For a variety of perspectives on the role of Pearl’s causality theory in fairness,
see Kusner et al. [2017], Kilbertus et al. [2017], Nabi and Shpitser [2018] and Chiappa [2019].
6.1 Scenario 3: College Admissions
For the purpose of college admissions, we wish to predict whether a student will drop out before
completing his or her degree. Suppose we model the situation using the PDAG in Figure 18.
Suppose that the admissions committee wishes to use all of the relevant information about
student performance contained in the student’s SAT score X2, but otherwise wishes to ignore
the student’s race-laden socioeconomic status X1, despite the fact that socioeconomic factors
do have a direct effect on a student’s probability of dropping out. In the language of Kilbertus
et al. [2017], this means that X2 is a resolving variable. The Independence criterion would not
allow us to use all of the information in X2, since we would have to extract the component of
X2 which is independent of the student’s race A. Separation or Parity by Signal, on the other
hand, would not allow us to fully make use of X2 while entirely excluding information in X1.
In fact we actually desire for A to have no direct effect on R that is not mediated by X2. We
can express this criterion using the formula for Controlled Direct Effect (CDE) as:
P(R | do(A = a),do(X2 = x)) = P(R | do(A = a′),do(X2 = x)) (2)
for all a, a′ ∈ A and all x in the range of X2. In this case, this do-expression is identifiable and
simplifies to the expression R⊥⊥ A | X2. However, in cases when a resolving variable is itself
confounded with other variables, the do-expressions in (2) may be unidentifiable or require some
do-calculus to resolve into observational expressions.
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Figure 19: The random variables in Scenario 4: an unobserved variable, and various features
and their relationship to religion A and car accident status Y .
6.2 Scenario 4: Insurance Prices
In the scenarios we have discussed so far, we model the sensitive characteristic A as an exogenous
variable. Thus A has always been a root in our PDAG models, and the total causal effects of A
on endogenous entities such as R and Y coincide with the observed effects. However, when A
is an endogenous variable, there may be backdoor paths from A to our predictions or response.
Consider the following scenario, which makes clear the need for causal reasoning in fairness.
We wish to predict whether an individual is likely to have a car accident for the purpose of
determining her insurance premium. Suppose we model the relevant variables using the PDAG
in Figure 19.
We may deem it unfair to use an individual’s religion, A, as a factor in our prediction, R.
However, there is a backdoor path between A and Y , and thus A and Y are marginally dependent.
For the same reason, any prediction R which is a non-trivial descendent of the individual’s driving
record X will fail to satisfy Independence. Of course, as in all of the ubiquitous cases when the
features are ancestors of the response, conditioning on Y will not black the path between R and
A either, thus our prediction will also fail to satisfy Separation.
In this case, we need not consider X to be a resolving variable. Whatever dependence results
between A and R is spurious. We are interested in ensuring that A has no Total Effect (TE) on
R, which we can express as:
P(R | do(A = a)) = P(R | do(A = a′)). (3)
Note that this is a special case of the Counterfactual Fairness criterion in Kusner et al. [2017],
although these authors do not explicitly consider cases in which A is endogenous. The conse-
quence of this criterion is that we can freely construct predictions R which are based on traffic
tickets, X, or other inferred aspects of personality, U .
7 Conclusion
In Scenarios 1 through 4, PDAGs have proven to be fertile ground for developing intuition about
the three basic oblivious criteria for fairness: Independence, Separation, and Sufficiency. In
general, constructing a PDAG model relating the sensitive characteristic, features, and response
is a clarifying exercise, because it allows us to more directly connect our senses about what
is intuitively fair to the implications of the decisions we make in specifying an algorithm. In
contrast to the project of constructing statistically optimal estimators, a fundamental concern in
constructing fair estimators is blocking the use of information which is subjectively unacceptable.
Here, PDAGs and d-separation are natural tools.
In contrast, the oblivious fairness criteria alone are limited, because their behavior is opaque
and sensitive to the particularities of the scenario. Enforcing Independence between the sensi-
tive characteristic and the prediction was seen to have wildly different implications in scenarios
when the response was dependent on race and when it was not. In the former case, Indepen-
dence prohibited discrimination which could not be statistically justified, and in the latter case,
Independence was an intervention in favor of adversely affected groups.
Sufficiency can be achieved by blocking all paths through which information can flow be-
tween the sensitive characteristic and the response. Generally this is only possible by accurately
recovering the signal. That is, it was shown that Sufficiency can be achieved by appropriately
18
choosing the features through which information flows from race to the response and appropri-
ately choosing a prediction that blocks that flow of information.
Separation naturally allows for the use of features which are descendants of the response, but
exhibits strange behavior whenever there are features which are non-descendants of the response,
even when those features are independent of the sensitive characteristic. For non-degenerate and
faithful PDAG models, Separation will not hold since the response is comprised of not only the
signal, but also the noise, which obscures the information about the signal in the response. In
Scenario 1, a violation of faithfulness was induced to produce an optimal prediction rule that
turned out to be highly inappropriate, for some groups even requiring the addition of further
random noise.
For the most part, these measures have been found wanting. We join the recent consensus
that the assessment of fairness in algorithms should not start and end with the use of a singular
criterion. The constraints we wish to impose on predictions should be sensitive to each scenario,
and PDAG models can help to explore them.
More generally, we notice that there is little consensus on the underlying philosophical prin-
ciples that should provide the foundation for the quantification of fairness. While much work
in fairness seems to be framed around preventing unfairness like that allegedly exhibited by
the COMPAS algorithm, there is no consensus that the COMPAS algorithm was ever unfair.
We worry that as constructs from fairness are taken out of context and treated as black boxes
for mathematical study and elaboration, the implicit underlying notions of fairness will be ob-
scured. We hope that fairness research can be grounded in clear, practical examples of the ways
algorithms can be unfair.
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